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Efficiency Wage Contracts, Worksharing, and West 
German Unemployment 
A Comment on F.R. FitzRoy 
E k k e h a r t Sch l i cht 
This is a st imulating paper on an important topic; namely short-term versus long-term 
employment contracts and their impact on employment and efficiency. Short-term 
contracts permit employment responses to exogeneous shocks and might even - as 
argued by FitzRoy - lead to an optimal response in working hours (work sharing), but 
they involve some costs insofar as the firms must create incentives to assure sufficient 
effort. This leads to efficiency-wage unemployment. Long-term contracts might solve 
the incentive problems without using efficiency wages and associated unemployment 
and might also have efficiency advantages with regard to the creation and use of firm-
specific human capital. It is argued that German unemployment is due to inflexible 
wages, brought about by inflexible institutions, centralized bargaining and egalitarian 
wage policies, rather than being attributable to efficiency wages or long-term 
contracting. Since I cannot discuss here the many arguments presented in this paper, I 
shal l concentrate on a few points which seem to me to deserve some attention. 
A l though I agree that long-term employment contractswnight have important 
efficiency advantages i n terms of incentives and specific human capital formation, 
there are also important draw-backs: A world of life-time employment sentences 
without co-determination seems to me not that attractive. It is good for those who were 
lucky at the beginning of their career, but it is not so good for those who started their 
career i n the wrong firm or m the wrong industry: They are locked i n . Equal iz ing forces 
and allocative efficiency of labor might be better under a system of short-term 
employment contracts. 
On the other hand, I find efficiency wage theories probably realistic but for other 
reasons than those given in traditional economics, as I try to explain elsewhere i n this 
volume. Formulations l ike FitzRoy's equation (3), although quite general, seem to be 
rather ad-hoc and presuppose from the outset that wages control efficiency and 
mechanisms other than long-term employment contracts are simply inconceivable. I 
doubt this assumption. In the turnover case, e.g., a simple tax on turnover, payable by 
the employees, would create sufficient immobility to rule out unemployment (see 
Schlicht 1978). The same argument applies to the Shapiro/Stiglitz (1984) discipline 
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case, and there seems even not to be a general presumption that equivalent regulations 
could not be introduced by self-interested agents in order to exploit - and thereby 
eliminate - the inefficiencies which would be associated with efficiency-wage un-
employment. It is true that these changes might turn short-term into long-term 
contracts, but it illustrates that there is no presumption either which rules out a 
smooth change of labor contracts between short-run and long-run i n response to 
preferences and technology, and hence no presumption for inefficiencies arising from 
non-convexities. (Actually, labor contracts of both types coexist in Japan as well as in 
Germany.) 
Is i t true, however, that the main source of German unemployment must be seen in 
"rigidit ies" rather than in efficiency wages? (I agree with the other assertions.) To my 
mind, efficiency wage theory has been concerned with the explanation of what appeared 
as rigidities. In other words, efficiency wage theories of unemployment tried to reveal 
the economic function of unemployment which precludes its e l i m i n a t i o n by 
expansionary fiscal and monetary policies, and the fear that such a policy w i l l increase 
inflation rather than increase employment must have its rationale i n a k i n d of 
efficiency-wage theory, i f it has a rationale at a l l . 
More down to-the-earth i t could be argued that centralized barga in ing has its 
advantages, too: The unions are forced to take economy-wide consequences into 
account; bargaining costs as well as moral havoc are minimized (as compared to firm-
level-bargaining); price-taking behavior is simulated; and equity and solidarity 
concerns are, after a l l , real concerns which might lead to even worse outcomes i f 
unchanneled by centralized bargaining (Akerlof and Yel len 1987). 
I shall leave it at that. After a l l , I have not made up my mind yet with regard to the 
points mentioned as well as to numerous other points made i n the paper. There might 
well be inefficiencies, and i f we understood them we might design policies to cope with 
them. The main contribution of this paper is, it seems to me, to raise these points in a 
constructive fashion. 
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